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Abstract 
3D CAD software is vital to record design information.  The industry is oligopolistic and despite standards has 
all the elements associated with a lack of interoperability, namely proprietary software, network effects and 
lock-in.  Interfaces are similar to standards and their indirect effect amplifies their impact and value and distorts 
the intended intellectual property protection.  The distributed machine code is not readable and the restrictions 
on reverse engineering are tantamount to making the information a statutory trade secret.    
The regulation of interoperability is a balancing act between control by rightsholders and openness of interfaces.  
Identifying the ‘pivot’ point must take account of the software’s functional nature and data integrity. Existing 
proposals are evaluated and recommendations with least intervention that encourage market solutions are made.  
These involve a modest and doctrinally appropriate amendment to Article 6 of the Software Directive to 
legitimise the sharing of interface specifications obtained by decompilation and encourage the use of a public 
register to improve dissemination.     
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1. Introduction 
Software interoperability
1
 is considered to promote socially desirable goals and public 
benefit.
2
  Interoperability encourages more use of resources and more competition which 
should stimulate innovation
3
 which is likely to be of the ‘follow on’ type rather than 
‘breakthroughs’.4  While there is no systematic body of empirical evidence of a link between 
interoperability, and competition and innovation, the claim is often supported by illustrative 
examples.
5
   
The adoption of standards, regulation and market pressure has aided interoperability but 
important challenges remain in many areas including health care systems, cloud computing 
and 3D Computer Aided Design ‘CAD’ software.6  3D CAD software is crucial to the 
economy as it records vital design information and knowhow on all engineered products in 
the developed and developing world.  Another vital role is facilitating rapid innovation, 
which enables the development of sophisticated products.  The 3D CAD industry is made up 
of four main suppliers who are profitable and successful – Siemens, Autodesk, Dassault 
Systemes and Parametric Technologies – in an oligopolistic market.7   
                                                     
1
 The Software Directive considers interoperability to be the functional interconnection and interaction between 
elements of software and hardware and ‘the ability to exchange information and mutually to use the information 
which has been exchanged.’ Council Directive 2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer programs 
(‘Software Directive’ or ‘Directive’ as case requires) [2009] OJ  L111/16, recital 10.  Interoperability requires 
two or more programs to exchange and use information.  It does not require the programs to use the same code 
or perform identical or similar functions, but they must be able to exchange and use essential information.  The 
exchange of information between programs takes place through interfaces which can take various forms:  
application programming interfaces (APIs), protocols, and data file formats.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
2
 Pamela Samuelson, ‘Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?’ (2009) 93 Minnesota Law Review 
1943; Oracle America Inc. v Google Inc., Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Professors in Support of 
the Defendant-Cross Appellant and Affirmance 30 May 2013; Urs Gasser and John Palfrey, ‘When and how 
interoperability drives innovation’ (Berkman Publication Series, November 2007) 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/interop-breaking-barriers_1.pdf (accessed 15 
October 2015). 
3
 Commentators including Mark Lemley, ‘Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem’ (1996) 28 
Connecticut Law Review 1041, recognise the benefits of interoperability while others consider the position is 
more ambiguous, for example Mario Gil-Moto, ’Economic aspects of the Microsoft case: networks, 
interoperability and competition’ in Luca Rubini (ed), ‘Microsoft on Trial’ (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2010) 
344, 359 et seq.          
4
 Follow on innovation is dynamic rather than static competition, for example coming within the description of 
dynamic competition advocated by Gregory Sidak and David Teece, ‘Dynamic competition in antitrust law’ 
(2009) 5(4) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 581, 600 et seq. 
5 Gasser (n 2).  
6
 Lack of interoperability is not limited to software industries but includes all products which have a software 
component.  Industries that have a need for software to be compatible include cars, traffic control systems, 
construction, defence and many more.     
7
 Siemens PLM, Autodesk, Dassault Systemes and Parametric Technologies ‘PTC’ represent the ‘high-end’ and 
‘middle range’ suppliers of 3D CAD software.  An oligopolistic market refers to a market structure with a 
limited number of sizeable firms.   Because the behaviour of one firm has an appreciable impact on the overall 
market condition, and thus indirectly on the situation of each of the other firms, oligopolistic firms are 
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3D CAD software is proprietary, protected by copyright, trade secrets and patents.
8
 Despite 
attempts to promulgate standards in 3D ‘CAD’ software formidable interoperability issues 
remain and users are essentially ‘locked in’ once they have purchased a particular brand of 
software.
9
   There is evidence that lack of interoperability causes a problem for users and 
results in expense, waste, reduced efficiency and lock-in which affects competition.
10
  
Imperfect interoperability is estimated to cost the US automotive supply chain at least $1 
billion per year.
11
  Incompatibility between two versions of Dassault Systemes’ CATIA 3D 
CAD software delayed the delivery of the A380 in 2006 and resulted in a $6 billion loss for 
Airbus.
12
   Wiring bundles in the A380’s fuselage designed in Germany using one version of 
CATIA, V4, did not fit into the wiring spaces created by the French designers using the more 
modern CATIA V5.  The 3D CAD industry was identified in the 2013 Commission Staff 
Working Document as experiencing interoperability problems.
13
   
This paper starts with an overview of the current legal regulation of software interfaces, 
namely application programming interfaces ‘APIs’ and data formats.  The next section 
considers what lessons we can learn from doctrinal and empirical research of the 3D CAD 
industry.
14
  The third part of the paper considers proposals for reform made by various 
commentators and identifies which proposal could improve openness without damaging 
                                                                                                                                                                     
interdependent. European Commission Guidelines (2004/C 31/03) on the assessment of horizontal mergers 
under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ [2004] C 31/5, footnote 
29.  
8
 The stated policy in the suppliers’ annual reports is to protect their intellectual property rights by a 
combination of patent, copyright, trademark and trade secret protections, confidentiality procedures and 
contractual provisions.  Apart from Siemens, software and related services is their sole product.  Between them 
they own over 1000 patents.    
9
 Cyon Research ‘Survey of Engineering Software Users’ Cyon Research Corporation 2009, 19, found that users 
ranked interoperability as one of the three most important selection criteria, along with total cost of ownership 
and improving product quality. 
http://cyonresearch.com/Portals/0/files/whitepapers/Cyon%20Research%202009%20User%20Survey.pdf 
(accessed 31 October 2016);  Chad Jackson and David Prawel ‘The 2013 State of 3D Collaboration and 
Interoperability Report’ Lifecycle Insights and Longview Advisors, 7 – 8.  
http://www.plm.automation.siemens.com/en_us/Images/Lifecycle-Insights-2013-Collaboration-
Interoperability_tcm1023-210162.pdf (accessed 31 October 2016). 
10
 Jackson (n 9). 
11
 Smita Brunnermeier and Sheila Martin, Research Triangle Institute ‘Interoperability Cost Analysis of the U.S. 
Automotive Supply Chain’ Center for Economics Research for NIST (Final Report, March 1999). 
12
   Doug Bartholomew Born in a Storm Baseline www.baselinemag.com/c/a/Projects-Processes/PLM-Boeings-
Dream-Airbus-Nightmare/3 (accessed 11 January 2017) 
13
 Commission Staff Working Document ‘Analysis of measures that could lead significant market players in the 
ICT sector to license interoperability information’ SWD (2013) 209 final, 18 (‘Commission Staff Working 
Document’).  
14
 Ten interviews in a semi-structured form where undertaken by the author with senior executives of 3D CAD 
suppliers, industry analysts, members of the ISO STEP committee, 3D CAD users and suppliers of 
complementary software. 
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innovation.  The proposals mainly require changes to Intellectual Property Rights ‘IPR’ 
protection.  Fourth and finally a new recommendation is made that requires minimum 
intervention, balancing the control and access requirements of industry and users.  The 
recommendation centres on improving access to information by the removal of Article 6.2(b) 
of the Software Directive
15
 to allow for the sharing and public registration of interface 
specifications including those obtained by reverse engineering.   
 
2. Legal Regulation of Interoperability 
This section will give an overview of the present regulatory landscape of software interfaces 
by IPRs and competition law and the role of standards to encourage interoperability.  
    
 IPRs in software interfaces  2.1
By placing emphasis on the functionality of data formats the CJEU considered that the ideas 
and principles which underlie interfaces are not expression and are not copyright protected.
16
  
This means that an interface specification written by analysis of a program without copying 
the expressive code can avoid infringing copyright.
17
  APIs were considered in the US case of 
Oracle v Google where the District Appeal Court was not persuaded by the functional, 
subject matter approach, to determine the ideas/expression dichotomy.  In addition to direct 
copying of the code, indirect copying of the sequence, structure and organisation had taken 
place which should be determined using the abstraction, filtration, comparison test.  The US 
can take a traditional approach to ideas/expression and then implement the fair use 
exception.
18
 In Europe the CJEU gave a purposive interpretation of the Software Directives 
so that the functionality of interfaces should not restrict interoperability.
19
 
To improve interoperability, so that follow on innovation is generated, it is necessary to have 
access to and use of interface information but the machine code which is distributed to users 
is not readable.  Reverse engineering to create interface specifications occurs even though 
access to the software is restricted by Article 6 of the Software Directive.
20
  There is little 
evidence that reverse engineering presently provides a significant answer or incentive to 
suppliers in the 3D CAD industry to disclose interface information. 
Reverse engineering can use the ‘clean room’ procedure where analysis of competitors’ 
programs to write an interface specification is kept separate from the writing of the code to 
                                                     
15
 Article 6.2 (b) prohibits the dissemination of information obtained by legitimate reverse engineering as 
information obtained by decompilation shall not … ‘be given to others, except when necessary for the 
interoperability of the independently created computer program’(emphasis added). 
16
 Case C-406/10 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd [2012] (Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) 
(2012) CMLR 4, para 42. 
17
 Case C-406/10 SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd [2011] ECR I-1, Opinion of AG Bolt, para 55 - 
57. 
18
 Oracle America, Inc. v Google Inc (9 May 2014, 2013-1021, -1022) (Court of Appeal Federal Circuit) 50-60. 
19
 SAS Institute CJEU, para 39 - 46. 
20
 The Software Directive imposes certain restrictions on reverse engineering which includes black box reverse 
engineering in Article 5 and decompilation in Article 6. 
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implement the specification which prevents the copying of the expression.
21
  Interface 
specifications are created by the decompiler.  The machine code is decompiled to a higher 
level language which can be read by the decompiler.  Using the higher level information, a 
specification is written setting out the characteristics of the interface.  The subject of the 
interface specification can be an API or data file.  3D CAD suppliers were aware of this 
practice and thought it would be used in their company for reverse analysis.
22
  
The interface specification is the outcome of reverse engineering.  It is the decompiler’s 
interpretation of the requirements of the interface and does not include either the machine or 
original source code.
23
  It comprises the ideas and principles of the software’s interface and 
hence does not contain copyright belonging to the software’s rightsholder.  Despite the fact 
that the interface specification is normally free of copyright material, other than copyright 
belonging to the decompiler, the decompiler is restricted by Article 6.2(b) of the Software 
Directive in their ability to share the interface specification.
24
  The rightsholder cannot use 
trade secret law to prevent decompilation
25
 but the Software Directive creates a statutory 
trade secret law.
26
     
The proposal for the European Trade Secret Directive confirmed the legitimacy of reverse 
engineering while leaving unaltered the position for reverse engineering software protected 
by copyright law.
27
  There is normally no limitation on the use of the trade secret once 
lawfully attained and it is not feasible to differentiate between acquisition and use.
28
  
However Article 6 of the Software Directive does limit both the acquisition and use of 
information to the purpose of interoperability and for the independently created software 
while also preventing sharing of information.  In addition the use of the software itself is not 
                                                     
21
 prepared by Amedée Turner QC, one of the Parliamentary rapporteurs ,Eur. Parl. Doc. 136.025 (fin.) Annex 
II, DOC EN/RR/91422 (Nov. 1989) (the ‘Turner Report’); 
22
  Interviews (n 14). 
23
 Turner Report (n 21). 
24
 See (n 15) for text of Article 6.2(b).  
25
 Inge Graef, ‘How can Software Interoperability be achieved under European Competition Law and Related 
Regimes?’ (2014) 5(1) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 17; William Cornish et al Intellectual 
Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights ( Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 326 - no action lies for 
secrets embodied in physical objects which are available on the open marker which can be analysed to find out 
its secret content. 
26 Software Directive Article 6 2 (b) prohibits the dissemination of information obtained by legitimate reverse 
engineering, (n 15). 
27
 Commission ‘Proposal for a Directive on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information 
(trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure’ COM (2013) 813 final, para 5.1 and Article 
4, 1(b); Tanya Aplin ‘A critical evaluation of the proposed EU Trade Secrets Directive’ (2014) 4 Intellectual 
Property Quarterly 257, 262   
28
 Ronald Knaak and others, ‘Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition on the 
Proposal for a Directive on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information ( trade secrets) 
against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure’(2014) 45 (8) International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law 953, 961 
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permitted.
29
  The final Trade Secrets Directive itself is more restrictive.
30
  It permits reverse 
engineering
31
 where the acquirer is free from any legally valid duty to limit the acquisition of 
the trade secret.
32
   The restrictions in Article 6 of the Software Directive could amount to 
such a legally valid duty and this would take decompilation of software outside the scope of 
the lawful acquisition, use and disclosure provisions of the Trade Secrets Directive.  The 
consultation documents on the Trade Secrets Directive published by the Commission contain 
no information to support the amendment or its potential consequences.
33
   There is reference 
to limiting reverse engineering when it has been contractually excluded, involves dishonest 
commercial practices or is contrary to national unfair competition practices.
34
 The impact of 
the change to the wording of Trade Secrets Directive will need to be established during 
implementation and subsequent litigation but meanwhile permission to decompile software 
appears to remain with the Software Directive with all its limitations.     
Even where there is no copyright in the interface specification the software’s rightsholder 
may have protected the interface through patent protection.  3D CAD suppliers have been 
granted numerous patents.
35
  With the exception of the Unified Patent, there is no exemption 
from patent protection for the purpose of interoperability which leaves decompilers exposed 
to patent infringement even if they comply with the Software Directive.
36
  The concept and 
                                                     
29
 Ibid, 961 
30
 Council Directive 2016/943 of 7 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business 
information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure[2016] L 157/1, recital 16 states 
the Directive should not create any exclusive right to know-how or innovation protected as trade secrets.  The 
Directive’s definition of trade secrets is in line with art. 39 TRIPS - secrecy, commercial value and reasonable 
steps to preserve secrecy.  As the spectrum of information currently protected by trade secrets is wide it was 
acknowledged that extending the existing IPRs or creating a sui generis IPR in trade secrets would result in over 
protection.   Creating such a monopoly right would not allow for ‘distinguishing between the misappropriation 
of information and the mere acquisition of knowledge (e.g. by reverse engineering or by parallel discovery). 
Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment on the proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade 
secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure {COM(2013) 813 final}, 45 
31
 Reverse engineering is referred to in Article 3 (1) (b) of the Trade Secrets Directive as ‘observation, study, 
disassembly or testing of a product or object’.   
32
 Trade Secrets Directive Article 3 (1) (b) ‘Observation, study, disassembly or testing of a product or object that 
has been made available to the public or that is lawfully in the possession of the acquirer of the information who 
is free from any legally valid duty to limit the acquisition of the trade secret.’ (emphasis added) 
33
 https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-property/trade-secrets_en for example the Commission 
Impact Assessment (n 30) and the European Parliament report on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade 
secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure (COM(2013)0813 – C7-0431/2013 – 
2013/0402(COD)) (accessed 19 November 2016) 
34
 Recital 16 and 17 of the Trade Secrets Directive.  
35
 (n 8).   
36
 Estelle Declaye & Matthias Leistner, Intellectual Property Overlaps (Hart Publishing 2011), 91, technical 
matter is usually excluded from copyright but the overlap of software is clearly an exception to the rule; Julie E 
Cohen & Mark A Lemley, ‘Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry’ (2001) 89 California Law 
Review 1, 21 Reverse engineering is important in preserving competition and compatibility between products 
particularly in markets characterised by network effects. 
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implementation of software patents is flawed, does not incentivise innovation and could 
restrict the operation of standards and interoperability.
37
  Patent protection fails to adequately 
address the indirect effect of control over interface specifications on interoperability and it is 
seriously doubted whether patent protection of interfaces can be economically justified.
38
  
There may be a failure of the market with overprotection of interfaces which cannot be 
rectified by reverse engineering or, as discussed below, by conventional competition law in 
an oligopolistic market.
39
  Because interfaces are standards and have an indirect effect they 
give an unplanned expansion of IPR rules both for copyright and patents.  The hidden nature 
of the code giving protection equivalent to a statutory trade secret also overprotects the 
interfaces. 
 
 Intervention by competition law 2.2
There is debate as to whether intervention, such as by competition law restricting IPRs to 
mandate disclosure of interface information, is justified.
40
  IPRs are themselves a form of 
intervention but are seen by many as an almost inviolable right to encourage innovation.  
Supplier lock-in may justify intervention
41
 and it may be necessary to strike a balance 
between control by the rightsholder to incentivise innovation and openness of interfaces to 
achieve interoperability.  This can be achieved either ex ante by IPRs or ex post by 
competition law.
42
  As interfaces have indirect effects their value comes from being a 
standard and the balance may favour openness more than for other subject matter in the 
                                                     
37
  Pamela Samuelson (n 2) - while patents may not be well suited to software inventions, there is said to 
presently be insufficient empirical evidence that patents are such a major impediment to interoperability that the 
exclusion of interfaces from patent protection is justified.  There are however several examples of established 
firms with strong market positions taking patents on interfaces, possibly with the aim of controlling the 
development of competing and complementary products.  Patents are considered most threatening to 
competition when they are held by established firms with market power which may use them to leverage their 
dominant position in one market into an adjacent market; Sally Weston and others ‘Open Standards in 
Government IT: a Review of the Evidence’ (UK Cabinet Office September 2012), 33. 
38
 Maureen O’ Rourke, ‘Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law’ (2000) 100 Columbia Law Review 1177, 
1218  the exclusionary power of patents in interfaces is considered strong and noting that many interfaces are 
arbitrary, obvious and /or of low intrinsic value. 
39
 Weston (n 37) 30. 
40
 Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs and Bruno Peixoto, ‘Success, Dominance and Interoperability’ (2009) 84 (4) 
Indiana Law Journal 1157. 
41
 Supplier lock-in and market lock-in are distinguishable as in the former the cost of entering the market is 
prohibitive while in the later customers can afford to bear some of the cost and the market can rely on market 
forces and if necessary ‘creative destruction’ to change a dominant supplier in the market. Carl Shapiro and Hal 
Varian, Information Rules - a strategic guide to the network economy (Harvard Business School Press, Harvard, 
1998); Paul Klemperer ‘Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications 
to Industrial Organizations, Macroeconomics, and International Trade’ (1995) 62 (4) Review of Economic 
Studies 515.  
42
 The merger regulations are however able to provide an ex ante control of interoperability which is also 
flexible as it takes the individual circumstances into account, for example Intel/McAfee Case (COMP M5984) 
Commission Decision [2011] OJ C 98 -1 and EUR-Lex 32011M5984.   
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computer program.
43
  Industry interviews supported this differentiation in purpose and 
importance. 
44
           
To achieve more openness and interoperability disclosure of interface information is needed 
and competition law can give a remedy in exceptional circumstances.
45
  This remedy is only 
available where there is an abuse of a dominant position, but the 3D CAD industry is 
oligopolistic with no single dominant supplier.  The remedy of disclosure of information 
under competition law is not available in oligopolistic markets.
46
  Interoperability is unlikely 
to narrow the definition of the market to a single supplier and it is also unlikely that the 
suppliers will be considered collectively dominant.  The argument that has been made that 
competition law makes amendment to IPRs unnecessary
47
 is disproved because in 
oligopolistic markets, where users are locked-in to suppliers due to a lack of interoperability, 
competition is affected but no remedy is available.     
 
 Standards in software interfaces  2.3
Standards are an important means of improving interoperability but can give additional power 
requiring the law to impose restraints on the royalties and other benefits enjoyed by the IPR 
holder.
48
  Standards, particularly compatibility standards which cannot be avoided, give an 
unplanned expansion of the protection for both copyright and patents.
49
  A further concern is 
that the royalty that can be imposed may be due to the nature of the standard rather than the 
value in the IPR.  The IPR holder may try to profit from the standard’s strategic position and 
extract excessive rents.
50
    Patents in standards must be licensed on FRAND terms which 
have to be agreed between the parties without the Standard Setting Organisation’s assistance.  
The 3D CAD industry has more than one formal standard including the most widely used 
                                                     
43
 Ashwin van Rooijen  The Software Interface between Copyright and Competition Law (Kluwer Law 
International 2010), 43 – 46. 
44
 Interviews (n 14) 
45
 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601. 
46In the software industry dominance has been defined narrowly, Vincent Pickering and Maurits Dolmans, ‘The 
1997 Digital Undertaking’ (1998)19 (2) European Competition Law Review 108, 109. Analysis of recent 
decision does not however give support to a lack of interoperability limiting market definition to single 
suppliers, Sally Weston ‘The Legal Regulation of Interoperability in an Oligopolistic Market’ (PhD thesis 
Bournemouth University 2015) 146 – 154.    
47
 Josh Lerner and Mark Schankerman, The Comingled Code: Open Source and Economic Development (MIT 
Press 2010).   
48
 The Commission’s Digital Single Market strategy will concentrate on standards and interoperability as a 
critical area for growth of the digital economy.  3D CAD is relevant to several areas of EU policy priorities 
where standardisation activities play a key role, for example Advanced Manufacturing, Commission’s ‘Rolling 
Plan for ICT Standardisation 2016’  
(GROW_RollingPlan_2016_ICT_standardisation_BROCHURE_160225.indd 1, 2016) 
49
 Ken Krechmer, ‘Open Standards: A Call for Change’ (2009) May IEEE Communications Magazine 88, 90-
91. 
50
 Knut Blind and others, Study on the Interplay between Standards and Intellectual Property Rights (Office of 
the European Union, Final Report 2011) 
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STEP standard but they all only provide limited compatibility.
51
  Although there is no 
evidence that FRAND, rather than royalty free, has caused a problem for STEP or had an 
impact on the industry, this may change if, to improve interoperability, interface availability 
and informal standards become more prevalent.  As the information available becomes more 
dynamic negotiating FRAND licenses could be a drag on innovation.  The argument that 
claiming royalties in interface standards incentivises innovation is nuanced and has certainly 
not been made convincingly.
52
   
 
3. Interoperability in the 3D CAD industry – what lessons can we learn? 
This section will consider the impact of software interoperability in the 3D CAD industry 
within the present legal regime and what lessons can be learnt to inform future legal reform.    
 Market pressure  3.1
There appears to be little effective market pressure on the suppliers to improve 
interoperability.  Suppliers with a significant part of the market benefit from a lack of 
interoperability and lock-in effects and may not want to license interoperability information 
for their product.
53
 Their most important customers are OEMs
54
 which value integrity of data 
as highly as interoperability.
55
  The suppliers’ concept of openness is to make their own 
software able to ‘ingest’ data from other suppliers’ systems to encourage customers to stay 
with them.
56
  Reverse engineering has not made a significant impact, certainly not sufficient 
to encourage suppliers to make disclosure of interface information.  As the industry is an 
oligopoly with no dominant supplier a main legal tool for improving interoperability, 
competition law, is not available.       
Despite the lack of pressure there has been a market response to improve interoperability.  
This has not always come from the suppliers of 3D CAD software but from other firms such 
                                                     
51
 Junhwan Kim and others, 'Standardised data exchange of CAD models with desing intent' (2008) 40 (7) 
Computer Aided Design 760.  The essential elements of lost information include: construction history – the 
procedures used to construct the model; parameters, variables associated with dimensions and other values; 
constraints relationships between parameter values and geometry and features such as shape configurations. 
51% of users of translation software get acceptable results 50% to 75% of the time. Longview Advisors, Inc. 
‘Collaboration & Interoperability Market Report’ 2010, 51 
file://bournemouth.ac.uk/data/staff/home/sweston/Downloads/cimr2010-longview.pdf (accessed 11 October 
2016). 
52
 Ibid; Weston (n 37). 
53
 Commission Staff Working Document, 7. 
54
 The Original Equipment Manufacturers ‘OEMs’ have the largest accounts and often dictate what software 
their tier suppliers use. 
55
 Interviews (n 14)     
56
 Ibid. 
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as translators
57
 which supply specialised software to enable models in competing 3D CAD 
software to interoperate to some extent.  The translator software companies have seen a 
market opportunity, and using standards, APIs and reverse engineering, they have developed 
software to assist the process of transferring data between proprietary 3D CAD systems.
58
  
While this gives some relief from lock-in it is a costly and complex process and is limited as 
standards and translation software provide only a partial solution.
59
  Although there is 
presently little pressure on suppliers to disclose interfaces they do provide, APIs, and data 
formats to the suppliers of translation software and other complementary software.
60
  But 
making the data available remains in the gift of the 3D CAD suppliers and even a version 
update can lead to temporary interoperability issues for complementary software.  Improving 
the availability of interface specifications would improve reliability. However given the 
complex nature of the software it may still require the specialist knowledge of the translators 
to achieve effective compatibility and it is not certain whether it is technically possible for all 
four systems to achieve full functional compatibility.  While market solutions in the form of 
translation software companies have emerged there generally appears to be little drive in the 
industry towards improving interoperability.   
 
 Protecting Users’ Data 3.2
 Despite the lack of interoperability 3D CAD software provides a good welfare benefit as it 
improves the potential to develop goods quickly and to manage related data efficiently.  3D 
CAD is sophisticated modular software developed over several decades and it is more than 
just a platform.  OEMs and other users rely on 3D CAD software to create, edit, use and store 
what is probably their most valuable data.  The software is highly complex and functional and 
has a ‘critical core’61  function in the users business, particularly as it stores their own 
proprietary data.  Lack of interoperability prevents users switching to another supplier 
immediately and can result in lost data.  Industry interviews showed that OEMs and other 
customers value integrity of data as highly if not more so than openness and full 
interoperability.
62
 It is important that the problem of interoperability is solved without 
disrupting the market.  The disruption to the music industry caused by digital downloads did 
                                                     
57
 For example Theorem Solutions www.theorem.com/Company/overview.htm and Tansmagic 
https://transmagic.com/.  These companies use a variety of methods including APIs and reverse engineering to 
provide translators to enable the direct exchange of native CAD files (both accessed 31 October 2016).  
58
 66% of respondents used CAD translation software Longview Advisors 2010 (n 51).  
59
 Translation software supplied with 3D CAD packages allows for one direction translation only.  Less than 
33% of engineering companies surveyed used a third party translator and of those only 45% indicate that they 
get the results they want with these applications better than 75% of the time. ‘Collaboration & Interoperability 
Market Report’ (Longview Advisors Inc. 2008) www.proficiency.com/downloads/3DMarketReport2008.pdf 
(accessed 12 November 2010).   
60
 Trevor Leeson, Theorem Solutions (MCADCafe interview 2014 PTC)  
http://www10.mcadcafe.com/video/Theorem-Solutions-Trevor-Leeson-Principal-Consultant-Tech.-Director-
Major-Accounts/43971/media.html (accessed 17 October 2014).  
61
 Interviews  (n 14) 
62
 Ibid. 
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not directly harm the user as music became more available.
63
 Disruption to the 3D CAD 
industry and to the supply of proprietary software in which users’ data is stored could be very 
harmful to the user and to society generally as manufacturing industry would suffer as vital 
know-how and legacy data could be lost.   
Continuing follow on innovation would appear to have more welfare benefit than some form 
of creative destruction which could destroy the existing software and replace it with a new 
platform.  3D CAD suppliers have invested heavily in designing sophisticated software and a 
model that just replaces it with something else is undesirable, unless it gives full backward 
interoperability, which given the complexity of the software, is very unlikely.  
Interoperability helps follow on innovation.  Not only does the software have intrinsic value 
but the users’ proprietary data is extremely valuable.  It is important to the user that they can 
access their data now and in the future.
64
  Interoperability allows this to happen but any 
changes to the legal regime should not destabilise the industry as it is necessary to ensure that 
users can continue to use the format of the software their own proprietary data is stored in.  
Changes must also take into account users’ needs, not only as consumers seeking competitive 
prices, but also to protect the integrity and access to their own proprietary data.  The 
functional nature of the software is relevant not only to determining the IPRs status of the 
interface but also to ensuring the legal regime balances the need for interoperability with the 
need for data integrity.   
 
 3D CAD software interfaces as de facto standards 3.3
In addition to taking into account  the impact, not only on the suppliers’ incentive to innovate, 
but also  any harm that could be done to the integrity and continuity of access to the users’ 
data, software interfaces require different considerations and treatment to other subject matter 
in a computer program. The concept that software interfaces require different treatment has 
been recognised in previous research
65
 in copyright case law
66
 and during industry 
interviews.  This is because software interfaces not only directly affect interoperability, but 
also because of their indirect effects as standards. Interfaces have an indirect function of 
controlling interoperability and access, not only in competing software and networks but also 
in complementary software and access to the user’s existing own data.   Their impact and 
value is amplified solely because of their role as standards and this extends and distorts the 
IPR protection they enjoy to the detriment of competitors, suppliers of complementary 
software, and users.  Interfaces will have a different optimal balance than the core subject 
matter with more openness to counteract the amplifying effect that control over standards has 
on market power.
67
     
                                                     
63
 It is uncertain what indirect effects, such as reduction in choice of artists, the disruption to music industry had 
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64
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 Summary  3.4
The different attitude expressed during industry interviews to the sharing of interfaces from 
the core software as well as the recognition that the value of interfaces arose less from their 
innate innovation than their value as de facto standards, supports existing theory.  While there 
is some market response within the industries to the demand for interoperability, and 
adoption of formal standards, these give a very incomplete solution.  Significant supplier 
lock-in remains and this can justify intervention.  A dominate feature of the industry is the 
value of the users proprietary data stored in the software.  The integrity of data is crucial for 
the user and intervention must take this into account and ensure backward interoperability is 
not reduced. 
 
4. A review of current proposals to reform the regulation of interoperability 
Regulating to promote interoperability must strike a balance between IPR protection which 
gives control, and the need for access and use of interface information which gives openness. 
This will also achieve the economic goals of increasing incentives to innovate and promote 
efficient allocation of resources.
68
 The central economic problem is said to be that copyright 
protection of software conflicts with the desire for information, particularly interface 
information, to be disseminated.  Overprotection favours present innovation over future 
innovation.
69
  Future innovation can be improved by allowing a degree of copying of 
interfaces.
70
 The reverse engineering provisions in Article 6 of the Software Directive is an 
attempt to strike a balance.  They were however formed more by lobbying than by economic 
Pareto optimality or empirical evidence.
71
  The introduction of the Software Directive was 
influenced by lobbying from US trade representatives and negotiators and Computer 
Associates v Altai and Sega Enterprise Ltd v Accolade Inc., which held that decompilation to 
achieve interoperability was ‘fair use’ were not decided until after the Software Directive had 
been enacted.
72
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The Commission appears to consider that as the Directive and in particular the decompilation 
provisions ‘were the result of intensive debate among all interested circles…the balance 
found then appears to be still valid today’ although maintaining the status quo is influenced 
by not wanting ‘to reopen the floodgate of debate’.73 In 2013 however a Commission Staff 
Working Document looked at measures that would lead to the licensing of interoperability 
information.  They considered that ‘copyright does not offer control over the information per 
se embodied in a work; only the expression is protected of that information where it 
constitutes the author’s intellectual creation.’  Because software is distributed in machine 
code even where interoperability information is not copyrightable there is no guarantee of 
effective access to the necessary protocols for developers.
74
  The Software Directive also 
gives control over the information obtained by reverse engineering even when it does not 
include expression as there are restrictions on sharing the information.
75
  While the ideas 
behind software interfaces are not copyright protected more freedom to access and share the 
information is needed to improve interoperability.   
The Commission Staff Working Document is one of several proposals that try to achieve a 
balancing interest.  While these proposals will be considered it has not yet been determined 
how best to identify and obtain the correct balance.  Neither the correct optimum balance nor 
the criteria for identifying it have yet been identified.
76
 While the need for balance is 
reinforced by the proposals there has been less progress on establishing criteria for 
identifying the ‘pivot’ between control and openness.77 This means it is difficult to put these 
principles into practice.   
To avoid instability and protect data integrity it is proposed that the correct approach is to 
start with changes that cause least intervention and only increase intervention if after eva 
luation and reflection there is insufficient improvement in interoperability.  To be effective 
any changes would need to be made across the EU and the first evaluation will be the recent 
proposals for an interoperability directive.
78
   
The proposals will be considered in reverse order, starting with those that are most 
interventionist and moving towards those that need the least change to the existing law to 
give more freedom to the market to use information that does not have IPR protection.       
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 An interoperability directive 4.1
An ‘Interoperability Directive’ has been seen as a way to ensure a common approach across 
Europe to enforce disclosure of interface information and other remedies.
79
  A Directive is a 
mechanism or wrapper that could include various rules to implement changes aimed to 
prevent IPRs being used to exclude competition without resorting to ex post competition law 
or to find a deliberate strategy of exclusion to justify intervention.
80
  Dominant suppliers, 
particularly of network or application infrastructure in software based internet services, such 
as software as a service, would be prevented from ‘locking in’ certain segments of the market 
which is said to happen when providing services across different platforms is costly.
81
    This 
would strengthen competition between software based internet providers and platform owners 
and the increased interoperability should reduce training costs and encourage new entrants to 
markets.
 82
   
An Interoperability Directive, including trade secrets and patent licences, was discussed in 
the Commission Staff Working Document in 2013 with Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis.  
Proposals included a mandatory license of right on FRAND terms or an interoperability 
exception to mirror Article 6 of the Software Directive. 
The Agreement on a Unified Patent Court
83
 provides that the rights conferred by European 
patents with unitary effect will not extend to the use of information obtained under Articles  5 
and 6 of the Software Directive.
84
  On establishment of the unitary patent and Unified 
European Patent Court patent holders will not be able to invoke patents against products 
implementing interface information obtained by black box or decompilation reverse analysis.  
This is similar to the provision in the doomed Software Patent Directive.  In 2002 the 
European Commission proposed a Directive on software patentability.  The European 
Parliament proposed an amendment that the use for the purposes of achieving interoperability 
would not be considered a patent infringement.  The Directive was defeated by a vote in the 
European Parliament in 2005 and has been dropped.
85
  As the exemption in the unitary patent 
does not however apply to classical European patents, or national patents which contain no 
such exemption, they will continue to stand in the way of using interface information.
86
   
The Commission Staff Working Document considered a proposal extending the exemption in 
unitary patents to all European or national patents which would prevent them being invoked 
against the use of information obtained from reverse engineering for interoperability 
purposes.  No royalty fee would be payable under this interoperability exception.  The 
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exception removes the risk from developers who rely on Articles 5 and 6 of the Software 
Directive to reverse engineer interoperability information that they would risk infringing 
patent rights, perhaps unknowingly.
87
   An alternative option was for patent claims which 
relate to interoperability information to be subject to an automatic license of right on FRAND 
terms similar to the arrangements for essential patents in standards.
88
   
A further approach is to licence both patents and trade secrets information on a case by case 
basis giving individual consideration rather than a general application of an exception or the 
right to licence regime.  This would be modelled on the Framework and Access Directives for 
access to and interconnection of electronic communications networks.
89
    Obligations to 
licence would be imposed on undertakings with significant market power which would 
require new bodies in each national regulatory authority to carry out ex ante analysis of the 
market to identify those suppliers who had significant market power.
90
  If the definition of 
significant market power is equivalent to dominance under European competition law
91
 it 
would not apply to oligopolies such as the suppliers in the 3D CAD market and so would not 
provide a remedy to lack of interoperability and lock-in in oligopolistic markets.  The 
consultation carried out as part of the Commission Staff Working Document identified that 
interoperability problems existed with suppliers that would not qualify as significant market 
players and gave the example of interoperability issues between different CAD systems.
92
   
After raising these initiatives the Commission Staff Working Document concluded that an 
Interoperability Directive should not proceed.  Even if effective, establishing the new bodies 
would be costly, and the analogy with the electronic communications networks breaks down.  
Software industries, such as 3D CAD, do not have identifiable market bottleneck assets.
93
  
They also have a different territorial scope as the electronic communications networks are 
primarily national whereas software markets generally cover the whole of the EU which 
makes implementation by national regulatory authorities inappropriate and ineffective.  It 
could also introduce a public law approach adding a third dimension to intellectual property 
law and competition law.
94
   
Introducing automatic licences of right, other than just for the unified patent, would entail a 
revision of legislation in all member states, which presumably the Commission Staff 
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Working Document did not consider feasible.  It was also doubted whether the provisions 
could use Article 114 TFEU as a valid legal basis or meet the principles of proportionality.
95
 
It was assumed that implementation would be costly but the new bodies would only be 
necessary if action was limited to undertakings with significant market power.  Automatic 
rights and interoperability exception for patents would, after amendment to the law, leave 
implementation and enforcement to the parties.         
The Commission Staff Working Document preferred the introduction of non-legislative 
measures to lower transaction costs and foster a culture of licensing through the use of model 
licences and guidelines on valuing interoperability to help parties agree royalty rates.
96
   
 
 Compulsory disclosure and mandatory licenses of right 4.2
Proposals to amend the existing legal position often consider some form of mandatory 
disclosure of interface information.
97
  Article 102 provided such a mandatory licence remedy 
in Microsoft.   The effectiveness of the remedy is limited as it is ex post and takes years to 
provide relief by which time the market may have moved on.  Compulsory disclosure through 
some form of regulation is rare in copyright.
98
 Regulation has serious drawbacks including 
the cost burden to the regulator and regulated and can stem the innovation it intended to 
create.   
Patent holders can already volunteer licences of right, normally in return for a reduction in 
licence fees.  This allows all patent holders the opportunity of licencing the technology on 
reasonable royalty terms.  As discussed earlier the Commission Staff Working Document 
considered converting this to mandatory licenses of right for patent claims covering 
interoperability information.
99
  Patent holders would be required to offer licences on FRAND 
terms, similar to the commitments in standard setting organisations.  However as this would 
require changing the legislation of all Member States the Commission considers 
implementing automatic mandatory licenses of right would be ‘very difficult’.100      
The Software Directive imposes a trade secret regime for computer programs
101
 which 
conflicts with a requirement for disclosure of any code but particularly the source code.  
Mandatory disclosure arrangements, including registration of the source code, could give 
copyright protection only in return for disclosure of the subject matter.
102
 But the source code 
is the ‘crown jewels’ and their disclosure is unlikely to strike the right balance between 
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revealing interface information and the ‘thin’ protection of copyright granted to the valuable 
and functional know-how in the source code.
103
  
A more direct and proportionate approach is a registration requirement by the rightsholder of 
the interface specification.  A disclosure requirement limited to the interface would not relate 
to the source code itself but only to the interface specification.  Disclosure of interfaces 
safeguards the public domain by limiting copyright protection to the computer program rather 
than the interfaces and ‘domain of interoperable programs.’104 This would protect the 
rightholder’s control with less detriment to incentives to innovate.  It would also limit 
transaction costs as it removes the need for third parties to invest substantially and without 
certainty of success in reverse engineering.  The interoperability information would be 
offered for free without competitors having to get a license from the copyright owner or to 
determine the royalty rate.  The cost of preparing the information rests on the rightholder 
which is probably the most cost effective solution but these costs may be substantial
105
 and 
may be a disproportionate burden on small developers.
106
 It is also possible that what the 
rightsholder makes available is not the optimum information.  This could involve the 
rightsholder in work that is of little benefit to the consumer.  It is effectively imposing a 
command economy on interface information rather than a demand economy which is 
achieved by reverse engineering.  If however the rightsholder disclosed information in 
response to the threat of reverse engineering it is more likely the information that is disclosed 
would more closely map onto the information that is required by the market which should be 
more efficient.    
Even where copyright protection is conditional upon full disclosure of interfaces, monitoring 
and enforcement remains problematic.  It is difficult to define the point at which adequate 
disclosure has taken place to ensure the body of the computer program has copyright 
protection.
107
  For example, what level of disclosure or incomplete disclosure is required and 
does the copyright owner have the say on where the interfaces are and how many?   As 
discussed earlier, interfaces can be defined as the rules by which data or instructions can be 
repetitively transferred between elements of a computer system.
108
  Interfaces exist where 
such transfers occur, making it difficult to categorise which portion of a program is truly an 
interface.
109
  As almost any part of the program can be considered as an interface
110
 it would 
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be difficult to establish conclusively what constitutes an interface and to say whether full 
disclosure has taken place, particularly as the source code would not be available.  This 
introduces a high level of legal uncertainty.  This level of uncertainty combined with the 
degree of intervention required to enforce the rightsholder to compile and disclose 
information means this option is not recommended.       
 
 Reducing the term of IPR protection 4.3
The fifty years minimum term protection required by the Berne Convention for literary works 
far exceeds the useful life of the software.  Shortening the term is not however easy.  The 
difficulty of fixing a single appropriate term meant that approach was rejected for 
replacement parts under design protection law.
 111
 ‘Attempting to influence the dynamics of 
platform software competition by identifying a single, fixed term of protection for interface 
specifications similarly appears too detailed an instrument to be effective.’112  Reducing the 
term of protection for all software does not improve the position for interoperability but could 
adversely damage incentives to innovate.  As interfaces have indirect effects as de facto 
standards reducing protection for interfaces alone to a shorter term is theoretically 
appropriate.  This could be based on the time it would take to reverse engineer the relevant 
specifications.  Given that interfaces can be subjectively identified and defined it would be 
difficult to operate a two tier regime for interfaces and other software.  A two tier approach 
could imply that these specifications are protected which is not the case.
113
  Rather than 
having to determine the nature of interfaces under the ideas/expression dichotomy the courts 
would be deciding whether code was an interface to determine its duration of protection.   
Introducing a shorter term of protection that is applicable to interfaces would be detrimental 
to vertical interoperability.
114
  Users of complementary software could be put in a worse 
position than they are now.  While voluntary data exchange does take place within the 3D 
CAD industry not all suppliers of complementary software have advanced access to APIs and 
their software might stop working each time a new version of the operating or platform 
software is released.
115
  Many users would suffer disruption to interoperability between 
existing complementary software and new versions of operating or platform software.  Users 
of complementary software for 3D CAD systems such as Finite Element Analysis and 
translation software could experience problems when new versions of the 3D CAD software 
are released and their complementary software may stop working for weeks or months.
116
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The suppliers of complementary software generally find APIs are not available before the 
release, or frequently not at all and have to rely on reverse engineering.
117
  Even if the 
copyright term was reduced to a matter of months, control would still remain with the 
operating or platform supplier.  If interfaces were given a short term of protection rather than 
excluded under the present regime the position for suppliers and users of complementary 
software could be worse.    
 
 Specific exclusion for interface information 4.4
The Software Directive and case law in the CJEU has categorised interface information 
amounting to ideas and principles as not being copyright subject matter.
118
    Case law has 
given guidance on what effectively amounts to an exclusion for those elements of software 
which are not concrete elements of expression.
119
  While the ideas and principles behind the 
interface, which can be extracted by reverse engineering, are not protected the code itself can 
still not be copied.  A proposal for a specific exclusion would go further than the existing 
legal position by excluding the code in the interface from copyright protection.  While 
interfaces can be subjectively identified and defined, the proposal is considered feasible as 
although many parts of a computer program could be named an ‘interface’, an interface 
specification is distinguishable from its implementation.
120
  It is only the lines of code that 
constitute the specification that would be excluded from protection which is only a small part 
of the interface.
121
   In practice this would be limited to the machine code as the source code 
would not usually be available to the decompiler, only the decompilers interpretation of the 
source code achieved by decompilation. 
An exclusion removing code in interfaces from copyright protection would not entirely 
remove control as access to the software’s code would remain limited to the purposes of 
interoperability.  However when software is reverse engineered under Article 6 the 
decompiler would have a right to use the code for the permitted purposes.  There is a need 
and benefit in copying the exact expression as it is an efficient way to achieve interoperability 
and can achieve the benefits of standardisation.  Such an ex ante approach could give 
certainty.  The courts have not gone as far, relying on the expression/idea dichotomy to 
provide a remedy that falls short of this proposed exclusion.  If however the information 
includes code, as that is part of the expression, it is probably copyright protected even though 
its originality may be subordinate to its purpose.
122
  Dissemination of the code, in addition to 
the interface specification, could economically be a very sensible re-use of the code as it 
would reduce waste and cost.  If it was limited to code implementing interfaces, rationally, it 
should not reduce incentives to innovate.
123
  This implementation does though require 
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amendment to the Software Directive in a way that redefines the copyright protection given 
to software rather than just changing the arrangements for access to those parts of the code 
that are not copyright protected.  For this reason it is recommended that these amendments 
should not proceed unless the following recommendation for sharing interface specifications, 
excluding code, does not achieve a balance that improves interoperability. 
 
5. Recommendation 
The above proposals are concerned with imposing obligations on rightsholders and changes 
to IPRs themselves.  The following recommendation only concerns access to interface 
information which is not copyright protected.  The sharing of interface specifications 
obtained by reverse engineering will be legitimised and a public register established to 
increase awareness and use.  This will improve access to the information needed to achieve 
interoperability without imposing any positive obligation on the rightsholder.      
Presently Article 6 of the Software Directive employs copyright to protect trade secrets.  It 
gives software companies the enviable position that they can license their products to the 
world while still protecting the trade secrets contained in those products without the need to 
get patent protection for functional elements.  If there was no need for the software to be 
compatible that position could be acceptable, however the strong protection of copyright and 
trade secret skews the balance to be overly closed. 
No other general principle of intellectual property law exempts the ideas underlying products 
from study by those wishing to create competing products.
124
 The law of trade secrets and 
confidentiality permits the study of ideas by reverse analysis.
125
  Trade secrets once learned 
by another are theirs to use.  The ideas contained in cookery books can be studied to develop 
competing recipes provided the expression is not copied.
126
  What is considered here is 
redressing the anomaly that ideas and other non-copyright protected aspects of software are 
not visible and that there are also restrictions on disseminating any information obtained from 
decompilation.   
 
 Reverse engineering software interfaces 5.1
Decompilation and reconstruction in a higher level language can result in the exposure of 
some vital knowhow that would otherwise remain protected as a trade secret.  It will reveal 
code which is copyrightable expression.  As the location of the code that is essential for 
interoperability may not be identified without an analysis of the wider program even the 
conscientious engineer may discover more than is essential for interoperability.    It is for 
these reasons that Article 6 was so contentious and drafted restrictively.
127
  However reverse 
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engineering even of the entire program will not of itself reveal all of the secrets of its design 
and development. 
Software reverse engineering does not lay bare a program’s inner secrets.  Indeed, it 
cannot.  The inner secrets of a program, the real crown jewels, are embodied in the 
higher level of abstraction material such as the source code commentary and the 
specification.  This material never survives the process of being converted to object 
code.
128
  
As the Explanatory Memorandum to the Initial Proposal for the Software Directive states 
‘Although it is technically possible to decompile a program in order to find out information 
concerning access protocols and interfaces this is a lengthy, costly and inefficient 
procedure.’129  It would not give any benefit to the pirates who have other shortcuts to 
produce illegal copies of programs.  Decompilation is not a preferred technique as it is 
difficult and expensive but sometimes it is the only feasible means of obtaining the interface 
information.
130
  The justification for preventing the disclosure of the interface specification 
obtained by reverse engineering has not been made out.   
‘A pirate wanting to copy a program can and will do just that – copy the available 
object code.’  [Attempting to] ‘recreate an entire program after it is compiled would 
be as sensible – and as economically efficient – as trying to unscramble an egg.’131   
Also the product if used for commercial purposes would infringe copyright as a ‘translation’ 
of the original program.
132
   
Reverse engineering is intended to act as a safety valve to enable a second program maker to 
develop an interoperable program when an existing program is not available.
133
  It is also 
intended to encourage the copyright holder to disclose the interface information 
voluntarily,
134
 although its success in this is mixed.  In the public consultation of the 
Commission Staff Working Document, only 24% of respondents considered the possibility of 
reverse engineering interoperability information by third parties represented an incentive to 
license interoperability information while 21% considered it did not.
135
  Industry executives 
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and experts were either unaware of the possibility of reverse engineering or did not consider 
it important to their decision making.
136
  This indicates that reverse engineering is not 
considered a strategic issue in the 3D CAD industry.  While reverse engineering provides a 
solution to interoperability in certain circumstances it is not a significant driver for the 
disclosure of interoperability information by rightsholders.  
 
 Economic rationale for reverse engineering 5.2
Permitting reverse engineering is thought to be economically sound as the innovator is 
protected by the costliness of reverse engineering and the lead time due to the technical 
challenge of reverse engineering
137
  Costs and lead time allow the original innovator to 
recoup its investment and protect incentives to innovate.  However the welfare benefits of 
allowing reverse engineering of interfaces differ from those of reverse engineering the 
software’s core subject matter.  In manufacturing industries reverse engineering is done to 
make directly competing stand-alone products.
138
   Copyright law prevents direct copying of 
software and interfaces are reversed engineered to improve interoperability of both 
complementary as well as competing programs. Interfaces also have a different, indirect and 
magnified effect on interoperability and hence on competition and innovation.
139
  Interfaces 
are standards and different considerations should apply to the treatment of IPRs, if any, 
present in the interface information.  IPRs in the interface could be used to leverage market 
power in a way that was unintended as a matter of intellectual property law.
140
  The 
interface’s value comes predominantly from this interdependence rather than intrinsic 
innovation.  Decompiling interfaces is not a market-destructive means of reverse engineering 
even in the absence of costs and technical challenges.
141
  The 3D CAD suppliers certainly 
distinguished between protection of the interfaces and the inviolable kernels.
142
  The logic 
that to be economically sound reverse engineering needs to be costly and difficult does not 
apply to interfaces.  With respect to interfaces, cost and difficulty is only a waste and 
economically undesirable.  There is no rationale for protecting the first comer.  The Software 
Directive already specifies that decompilation can only be done for interoperability which 
restricts software reverse engineering more than in traditional manufactured items.
143
  
Reverse engineering is legitimised by its purpose,
144
 and when restricted to interfaces, 
difficulty or cost, does not give any welfare benefit.   The goal should be to make reverse 
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engineering of interfaces as efficient as possible.    This will aid both horizontal and vertical 
compatibility. 
The Software Directive prevents access to ideas and other non-copyright protected aspects of 
software.  Noam Shemtov argues that the purpose of reverse engineering should not be 
limited to interoperability.  He makes the case that not only is this justified on the doctrinal 
grounds of the ideas and expression dichotomy but also by economic efficiency 
considerations.  The relaxation of the restrictions on decompilation would not cause a loss of 
incentives to create and develop but result in a more balanced system properly addressing the 
unique properties of software products.
145
   The US ‘fair use’ doctrine is not restricted solely 
to interoperability and is said to be more flexible than Article 6 of the Software Directive.  
The Software Directive does however make null and void any contractual provision 
attempting to prevent reverse engineering.
146
  There is no such statutory provision in the US 
and contractual provisions in software licences prohibiting reverse engineering are common 
and the enforceability of restrictions on reverse engineering has been highly contentious.
147
 
While decompilation in the US is not specifically limited to interoperability there must be a 
legitimate reason,
148
 the most prominent of which is for the purposes of interoperability.  
 
 Art of the possible  5.3
It is highly unlikely the climate in Europe has changed significantly to allow for a major 
change in the hard won provisions of Article 6.  The Commission has looked at the Software 
Directive and the question of interoperability on at least two occasions since the introduction 
of the Software Directive and on both occasions has shied away from making any changes.
149
  
There appears to be little appetite for legislative amendments in any form
150
 and certainly not 
on the psychological scale that would be required to permit decompilation of all software 
even with an ex post review by the courts as envisaged by Shemtov.
151
  While there may be 
doctrinal validity in allowing access to non-copyright protected aspects of software, the effect 
on the required balance and the economic consequences have not been established to the 
extent that a convincing case could be made to a hostile audience.
152
  Interviews in the 3D 
CAD industry reveal a clear distinction between allowing access to interfaces with a strong 
resistance to any dilution in control of what were considered core aspects of the computer 
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program.
153
  The need to strike a balance between control and openness is recognised
154
 but 
the means of converting this recognition into a reliable model to identify the pivot’s position 
is not yet available.  Rather than taking the purist approach, which might be doctrinally 
correct but which would meet with over-riding resistance, the guiding principle should be the 
art of the possible.  It would be best to take a step approach starting with the minimum 
intervention and evaluating its impact.   
A form of step approach was advocated by Rooijen in the form of a regulator with 
rulemaking, dispute resolution and monitory powers.  To achieve the middle ground between 
openness and control would require the use of levers such as lifting the ban on sharing 
decompiled code or shifting the burden of proof for availability of the interface information 
to the rightsholder.
155
  The regulator would not be called upon to carry out any market-
specific analysis.
156
 Regulators are used in some Member States to regulate Technology 
Protection Measures (TPMs) under the InfoSoc Directive
157
 and telecommunications.
158
    As 
a form of step by step approach, where the impact of the change can be monitored to achieve 
the optimum balance, the approach has advantages but it is unclear how it would be 
implemented.  Devolving to the regulator powers to vary the rules would involve a wholesale 
change to highly contentious provisions of Article 6 of the Software Directive and could lead 
to uncertainty if the regulator changes the rules too often.  It is unclear whether any execution 
of the rulemaking task would be effective at Europe wide level or only national or even 
specific case levels.  Nevertheless the approach has merit and as with the proposal for a 
specific exclusion for code in interfaces
159
 it should be considered if the following 
recommendation to permit sharing of interface specifications does not achieve the required 
balance and improve interoperability. 
 
 Restrictions on sharing information 5.4
Article 6 of the Software Directive permits decompilation where it is indispensable to achieve 
interoperability of an independently created computer program provided inter alia the 
information obtained is not ‘to be given to others, except when necessary for the 
interoperability of the independently created computer program’.160 
Article 6 (2) (b) was submitted by the French delegation in April 1990 and considered by the 
Council working group.
161
  It was adopted in the final directive and prevents the 
dissemination of information obtained from reverse analysis even when that information is 
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not covered by copyright.  The literature on the adoption of the Software Directive makes 
little mention of this provision and it does not appear to have met with opposition.  Energies 
were perhaps understandably concentrated on resisting other proposals such as preventing 
reverse engineering interface information being used to develop a competing program.  When 
making the point that decompilation should be permitted to produce non-infringing programs 
regardless of whether they compete with the decompiled program, ECIS said that to do 
otherwise would be contrary to the fundamental copyright tenet that the ideas and principles 
underlying a copyrighted work are dedicated to the public.
162
  To apply that principle to the 
non-sharing provision begs the question that if the work is dedicated to the public why should 
the decompiler be prevented from making it public? 
Decompilation is limited to ‘code’ and cannot reconstitute other preparatory material.  
Underlying ideas and principles derived from reverse engineering may be used only so far as 
the provisions of the Directive permit.
163
  The non-sharing clause prevents dissemination of 
those ideas and principles obtained by decompilation.  By contrast under Article 5.3 ideas and 
principles derived from ‘black box’ engineering, namely observation, study or testing by 
loading, displaying, running, transmitting or storing the program, has no restriction on the 
sharing of the ideas and principles.  It is only the information, including the interface 
specification, that remains protected as though it were a trade secret.    
The separation of Article 6 into two parts corresponds to separate possible violations of the 
author’s rights.  Article 6.1 concerns decompiling the original program and 6.2 producing an 
infringing program based on the results of decompilation.
164
   The Directive does not explain 
the nature of the obligation imposed on the decompiler in 6.2 and as most Member States 
merely duplicated the article no insight is given on their understanding of the obligation.  
Some commentators have argued that the use of the information is not a copyright issue.  
Access to the information contained in the program cannot however be given without a 
change in the normal rules of copyright.  This makes it necessary to ensure that removing the 
‘copyright barrier’ to access does not result in abuses that undermine the very protection the 
Directive was intended to give.
165
 
This ignores certain realities.  Firstly copyright protects expression which by implication 
means it protects something that is visible, audible or otherwise communicated to the public.  
It is not intended as a means to protect trade secrets.  Secondly, the restricted acts under 
Article 4 are basically reproduction, adaptation and distribution.  These are the normal acts 
which if undertaken with the rightholder’s consent will reveal the underlying ideas and 
principles.  The difference with computer programs is that, unlike most works that have 
copyright protection, the ideas and principles are not necessarily revealed when there is a 
legitimate reproduction, adaption or distribution of the software.  The problem is that acting 
within the ‘normal rules of copyright’ does not reveal these ideas and principles and 
something more and sui generis needs to happen.  It is a secondary consequence that the 
expression does not reveal all the ideas and principles of the copyrighted work.
166
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Thirdly, it is not a ‘copyright barrier’ that has to be removed but a technical hurdle that needs 
to be overcome to enable copyright to work in its normal manner to give a balance between 
protecting the expression while not giving a monopoly on the underlying ideas and principles.  
To restrict the purpose for which the program may be reproduced, as imposed by the 
Software Directive, is to restrict rights beyond that normally enjoyed.
167
    
Not only are software and the Software Directive unique in keeping the ideas underlying 
products exempt from study,
168
 but normally copyright law does not prevent the use of or 
dissemination of ideas or other non-copyright protected information.
169
  The Software 
Directive however restricts the use of information, such as the interface specification, to only 
achieving interoperability of the independently created computer program and prevents the 
information being given to others except when necessary for the interoperability of the 
independently created computer program.  To deny access to the ideas and principles 
underlying a computer program that are inaccessible without reverse engineering is 
analogous to saying that copyright protection of a book prevented the purchaser from reading 
it.  According to the Turner Report this is inherently wrong and would have a serious 
restrictive effect on innovation and competition.
170
   
 Encouraging the sharing of interface specifications  5.5
The change that is recommended is to amend the Software Directive to allow for the 
dissemination of interface information obtained by reverse engineering.  This would normally 
be in the form of an interface specification which is compiled from information obtained by 
reverse engineering.  The interface specification would not contain information protected by 
the software supplier’s copyright.171  
Limiting the use of the information obtained by reverse engineering is not understandable 
from an economic standpoint.
172
  Such information has the nature of a public good and 
welfare consideration requires that once produced there should not be exclusions of possible 
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users from that information.
173
 Presently each supplier must repeat the painstaking 
decompilation for itself but lifting the restriction would remove duplication of effort and 
avoid waste, allowing firms to specialise in providing interoperability information to other 
vendors.  Firms would be able to innovate secure in the knowledge that an interface is 
available
174
 while encouraging decompilation by the most efficient and specialised firms.
175
  
It would create a market for interface information which could encourage, but not oblige, 
suppliers to make their own interface information available to ensure its quality, and could 
also bolster the use of standard interfaces.  If firms could sell the interface information 
obtained by reverse engineering they could recoup the costs of the process.
176
  It could 
encourage start-up firms that specialise in this sort of information.
177
  While the ‘cheapest 
cost informer’178 is the original developer and owner of the software, other firms which share 
interface specifications they acquire by reverse engineering would also be efficient.  By 
stopping multiple competitors from collaborating on their reverse engineering efforts it leaves 
reverse engineering as a viable option only to large developers.  This makes it harder for 
smaller firms to enter and compete in the market.
179
   The pressure group SAGE
180
 recognised 
that an exception permitting research and analysis could disadvantage small companies which 
could not afford to conduct reverse engineering.
181
   
This market response will no doubt be resisted by many in the software industry with the 
same vehemence displayed when the Software Directive was introduced.   There is concern 
that:  
‘The sharing of interface specifications could evolve into a complex pattern of 
unmanageable (sub) licencing arrangements.  It could be prohibitively difficult for the 
rightsholder to ascertain whether use of his or her interoperability information by a 
third party stems from a valid (sub)license or whether it was obtained in a different 
manner and, therefore, possibly constitutes an infringement’182    
Properly decompiled interface specifications do not contain code or other copyright material 
belonging to the software rightsholder.  There is no doctrinal justification for the rightsholder 
being able to prevent its dissemination.  Legitimate conduct cannot be prevented just because 
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it is difficult to distinguish from illegitimate conduct.
183
  As will be seen the recommendation 
provides for a conservative step approach and encourages registration which could allow the 
rightsholder some element of monitoring of its interfaces.  This limited modification of 
Article 6 is intended to move a moderate step towards more openness.  It is also hoped the 
increase in access to interface specifications will challenge software rightsholders to make the 
interface information available themselves.           
The safeguards that have been imposed by Article 6 (1) can remain unaltered.
184
 Allowing the 
sharing of interface specifications obtained by reverse engineering would not require any 
dilution of these restrictions.  The original compiler would still be required to have a licence 
or other permission, to ensure the information was not already available and to limit the 
reverse analysis to only what was necessary for interoperability.  Indeed the dissemination of 
interface specifications could reduce the need for reverse engineering as more information 
would be available.  This could reduce the opportunity or excuse for looking at parts of 
programs wider than the interfaces.  
With regard to Article 6(2), reverse analysis could still be limited to cases where the original 
decompiler has an independently created computer program but the original decompiler could 
then make the interface specification available to others.  Ideally however the requirement for 
an independently created computer program would be removed to allow for software 
engineers to carry out decompilation purely to write the interface specification.  This 
certainly happens in the software community
185
 and encouraging the practice would help 
disseminate interface information.  The restriction that information should not be ‘used for 
the development, production or marketing of a computer program substantially similar in its 
expression, or for any other act which infringes copyright’ would remain valid.  The 
statement is really superfluous anyway as nothing in Article 6 or elsewhere permits the use of 
copyright material.
186
    
Some decompilers may not want to share the interface specifications as they may want to 
retain the competitive advantage the information gives them.
187
  The possibility of sharing 
interface specifications was discussed during industry interviews and several interviewees 
expressed interest in the possibility.
188
  Some also expressed surprise that it was not already 
permitted as they know of interface specifications being shared in the software community.
189
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In practice interfaces of individual computer programs would only have to be completely 
decompiled once.  When new versions appeared decompilation could be limited to those 
aspects that seem novel from running and observing the program.  If interface specifications 
from the original decompilation were continually and widely available, updating would be 
less time consuming and expensive.
190
   
The wider software industry does have a pattern of sharing information, not least in the open 
source community.  If there was a market for the interface information it would be possible 
for smaller developers to buy the interface information which would remove the burden of 
reverse analysis.  This could allow smaller developers to enter and compete in the industry.  
A market for interface specifications minimises ‘deadweight loss’ of administration and 
potentially enforcement. The availability of the information would mean there was less need 
to embark on reverse analysis.  Permitting the sharing of interface specifications is a form of 
‘prosumer law’191 which allows the user of the internet, or in this instance the computer 
programmer, to have an active role in obtaining interoperability including the ability to exit 
the program with their data.
192
     
The rationale behind Article 6 was said to be to encourage the rightsholder to voluntarily 
disclose the interface specification but this does not appear to have had a significant 
impact.
193
  If however decompilers can make that information available then this can either 
relieve the rightsholder of the burden of preparing the information for disclosure, or may 
encourage them to disclose the information themselves as they may feel more in control of  
the situation.  
 Specific amendments to Article 6 5.6
No amendment is required to Article 6.1 which can remain unaltered.
 194
 
While Article 6.1(b) can remain unaltered it has been criticised as it is uncertain when 
information is ‘readily available’.  Is it legitimate to charge for the information and if so how 
much and how complete must the information be?  Shemtov proposes inserting the words 
‘readily available under fair and reasonable terms’.195  This would be a sensible amendment 
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but not essential to the working of this recommendation.  Article 6.1 (c) has been criticised as 
until decompilation takes place it is not possible to know exactly what part of the code makes 
up the interface and needs to be decompiled.  It is likely that some extraneous code could be 
decompiled.  Inserting the word reasonable in the text so that it reads ‘acts are performed to 
the extent reasonably necessary to achieve interoperability of the independently created 
computer program’ could address this. However this amendment is not essential to this 
recommendation.  To implement this recommendation no amendment would be needed to 
Article 6.1.   
 
Article 6.2 amended to read:
196
 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not permit the information obtained through its 
application to be used for goals other than to achieve the interoperability of an independently 
created computer program. 
Article 6.1 refers to the interoperability of an independently created computer program while 
Article 6.2 refers to the interoperability of the independently created computer program. 
Replacing the with an in Article 6.2 removes the requirement for the decompiler to have 
already developed a specific computer program.  This would allow for decompilation by 
software engineers with the aim of licensing or otherwise distributing the interface 
specifications they have created.  Because of the difficulty of reverse engineering there is 
unlikely to be a rush of independent decompilers.  However during interviews some interest 
was expressed for this model, although not from the 3D CAD suppliers themselves.  The 
model could prove an efficient way of making the interface information available
197
 although 
some concern was also expressed that this could create competitive standards which would 
not be efficient.
198
     
Article 6.2(b) (not)…to be given to others, except when necessary for the interoperability of 
the independently created computer program; would be deleted in its entirety  
This would remove the restriction on the sharing of the interface specification.   
Article 6.2 c does not appear to add anything but can be included to avoid the doubt that the 
rest of Article 6 in some way gives an implied licence to infringe the copyright in the 
decompiled software.   
These amendments would allow for dissemination of the non-copyright protected 
information.  They do not relieve the restrictions that exist in Article 6.1 that limit 
decompilation to interoperability nor do they give any right under the Software Directive or 
other legal provision to infringe another parties intellectual property rights, other than the 
existing right to reproduce or translate software for the purpose of interoperability.  
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 Registration and publication of interface specifications 5.7
A registry of interface specifications is proposed with the aims of: encouraging decompilers 
to make their information available; improving knowledge as to what interface information is 
available, informing rightsholders when their interfaces have publically available 
specifications.  The registry would publish sufficient information on the interface 
specification to allow anyone searching the registry to identify the software interface that had 
been decompiled.  Interfaces of computer programs do not normally change substantially, 
although when new versions are released there will be some changes.  Once a version of the 
interface is registered and available the specification can be re-used, and combined with 
decompilation of changes to the latest version to give a current interface, without repeating 
the original work.
199
  
The rationale for the reverse engineering provisions in Article 6 was to encourage 
rightsholders to make interface information available.  The dissemination of interface 
specifications would be further pressure on the rightsholders to this end.  Indeed there is no 
reason why rightsholders should not avail themselves of the register.  This would give notice 
that the interface information was available.    It would address the difficulty identified in the 
Commission Staff Working Document of how to find and obtain interface information
200
 and 
help with one of the non-legislatives measures the Document recommended to improve 
advertising of the availability of interoperability information.
201
 Publication will also support 
the Digital Single Market strategy to make better use of standards.
202
  
 
 Safe Harbour 5.8
Registration is not compulsory, but to encourage the use of the registry, decompilers who 
notify the registrar that they have created an interface will be relieved of normal liability for 
infringement of copyright.  Where the decompiler complies in good faith
203
 with the 
provisions of Article 6 the rightsholder will not be entitled to an injunction nor to damages.  
To meet this requirement decompilers will be expected to keep, and when required disclose, 
records of the decompilation process.  The only remedy that will be available to the 
rightsholder is to claim a royalty on a FRAND basis for any copyright that might have 
unwittingly been included in the interface specification.   
Ideally the changes to copyright law in the Software Directive would be accompanied by the 
introduction of a patent interoperability exception.  This exception would state that, where the 
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results of decompilation or other reverse engineering for interoperability cannot be used 
because they are covered by a patent, such patents could not be invoked against products 
implementing the information.
204
 Alternatively the patent holder’s right would be to claim a 
royalty based on FRAND terms.
205
    As this arrangement only applies to interfaces and is 
intended to improve interoperability with minimum cost and regulation, a royalty free 
arrangement is preferable.  This would avoid the cost and delay of parties negotiating 
royalties on prices valued prior to the code becoming a standard interface.  This is considered 
to be difficult to achieve in the absence of further regulation.
206
 It is envisaged that the right 
to claim any FRAND royalties will be normally be invoked only when the interface 
specification infringes a patent right.  Interface specifications will generally not include 
copyright protected material such as code and there is little evidence of royalty claims for 
copyright in standards.
207
  This may also apply to interfaces as they are de facto standards.
208
    
The patent exception is not essential to this recommendation but it would remove the concern 
that, while responsible decompilation and dissemination of interface specifications avoids 
liability for copyright, it could still face claims of patent infringement.  If however a patent 
exemption could be brought into the regime a further amendment could not only encourage 
rightsholders to disclose interfaces on the register but also deter litigation by patent trolls.  It 
would provide that if the rightsholder makes interface information on their own software 
available through the register and it subsequently transpires the interface infringes a third 
party patent the safe harbour against normal intellectual property claims could protect the 
registering party.  This would make the rightsholder liable at worst for FRAND royalties.  
This would help protect registered rightsholders from claims by patent trolls.  Patent trolls are 
attracted to de facto software standards as infringement is easier to identify.
209
  If the 
rightsholder registered the interface the trolls would not be able to threaten injunctions or 
high damages claims so convincingly and would have to settle for a FRAND royalty.
210
   
 
 Contractual preference for registered interfaces 5.9
Another benefit that would flow from the introduction of the registry of interface 
specifications is that industry could prefer software where the interfaces are registered.  This 
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could be specified in contracts, including industry standard form contracts.
211
  This would 
start to bring the pressure to increase openness that is seen by procurement practices of public 
authorities
212
 into the private commercial environment.  This aspect could be more influential 
than any other aspect of the recommendation.  It is clear from industry interviews that public 
authorities specify open standards and will give preference to bids that will improve 
compatibility.  This requirement influences the behaviour of their suppliers to design their 
products using open standards.
213
  However public authorities are able to share information 
and collaborate to improve their knowledge and practices on using open standards.  As 
commercial enterprises conventionally compete, collaborating on open standards is harder.  
By defining open standard software in contracts as including software whose interfaces are 
registered and available either for free or on FRAND terms, commercial enterprises can 
increase the use of compatible software in an efficient and effective manner.     
 
 Registration platforms 5.10
Interface specifications could be posted on a register similar to the European Federated 
Interoperability Repository (EFIR) which includes the Joinup platform with a catalogue to 
enable Member States and the European Commission to document and share their solutions 
to interoperability.
214
 These initiatives are presently focused on public administration but the 
concept could be available to allow for recording and sharing of interface specifications for 
all commercial software.  This could be done, preferably by extending the existing repository, 
as some software has uses in both the public and private sphere, or a separate register for 
software used by the commercial sector.  This has the attraction of a one stop shop across 
Europe.   
However as it is proposed that registration will have the legal implications of relieving some 
liability it may be more appropriate for registration to be with the intellectual property 
offices.  These offices already have in place systems to record when registration takes place 
and to ensure the integrity of the data.  There would be no need to inspect or examine the 
information that is registered.  The register’s purpose is to publicise the existence of the 
interface information and provide a safe harbour to the registering party.  All negotiations and 
transactions concerning the information will be done directly between whoever registered the 
information and the prospective licensee.  A disadvantage of using intellectual property 
offices is that they are mainly nationally based and individual searches would need to be 
undertaken of each register.  However this could be overcome if a common service such as 
Espacenet is used.
215
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The register would increase access to interface information and improve interoperability 
without the cost of repeated decompilation of interfaces.  All that is required is a system of 
registering certain information and publishing it in an ordered way.  Several systems are 
available and could be modified appropriately.  The increased dissemination of the interface 
information in this relatively low cost but efficient manner would help to reduce under- 
utilisation of the information.  Transaction costs are borne by the prospective licensor and 
licensee which should be efficient and minimised, particularly if implemented alongside the 
soft measures recommended in the Commission Staff Working Document.  The 
recommended model licences could be made available on the same website as the register of 
interfaces which could encourage uptake.  The methodology or guidelines for assessing the 
value of the interoperability information will also help parties to minimise transaction costs 
and avoid deadweight loss.   
 
5.11 Challenges 
Challenges that have been identified to the successful implementation of the recommendation 
are firstly whether there is sufficient incentive to register the interfaces.  To remove 
disincentives there should ideally be no charge for registering the specification, which should 
be presented in a standard form.
 216
  Inspection on registration would be minimal which 
should contain the cost of maintaining the register.  To provide some financial incentive to 
the decompiler a system could operate allowing them to charge individual requests for access 
to the full registered interface specification.  User may be willing to pay for the convenience 
of accessing specifications which have a good reputation.  As the exception from copyright 
protection for interfaces will catch most of the information in the registered specification the 
ability to extract a direct monetary return from the information is uncertain.  The incentive to 
register interface information may need to rely on the indirect benefits for decompilers of the 
safe harbour and for rightsholders that their software is more likely to be specified in 
contracts.       
 
A further challenge is to keep pace with technological progress.  The register may encourage 
rightsholders to increase the use of digital rights management to deter decompilation.  While 
the anti-circumvention regime in the Information Society Directive does not apply to prevent 
reverse engineering of computer programs for the purpose of interoperability
217
 the 
increasing strength of encryption means circumvention is more available to those with 
sophisticated technologies.
218
  Also, as more software services are provided via web based 
systems the opportunities for meaningful decompilation are reduced.  These technical 
challenges however underscore the need for better dissemination and sharing of the interface 
information to enable openness without increasing regulation.      
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6. Conclusion 
Despite standards and the market driven solutions of translator companies, interoperability 
problems persist for users of 3D CAD software.  The software is vital to users to create, edit 
and store crucial valuable data and integrity of data is highly valued.  Improvements in 
interoperability and openness by continuing follow on innovation must avoid disrupting the 
industry.     
 
Conventional reverse engineering is tolerated as it is costly and time consuming which 
protects the rightsholder.  This rationale does not apply to software interfaces as their value is 
indirect, coming from their ability to control interoperability and networks rather than their 
intrinsic innovation.  There is less need to protect first comers as they should recoup their 
research and development investment from other aspects of the software rather than from the 
interface.  The Software Directive already restricts decompilation to the purpose of 
interoperability, which limits software reverse engineering more than in other fields,
219
  so 
that reverse engineering of software interfaces is legitimised by its purpose.
220
  Making the 
reverse engineering process any harder or costly is wasteful and without welfare benefit.
221
  It 
is not rational to protect the first comer and making access more difficult is not only 
inefficient but harms the consumer.   
 
Amending Article 6 of the Software Directive to legitimise the dissemination and registration 
of interoperability information obtained by reverse engineering, which does not contain the 
software rightsholder’s copyright, is doctrinally appropriate and is a modest step.  Monitoring 
the impact of the initiative will inform whether the regulation is in the right place to balance 
control and openness over the correct pivot.  If not, and more openness is required, then other 
proposals, such as allowing reuse of interface code, should be considered.  While the 
recommendation could be effective in isolation, ideally it should be accompanied by an 
exception to patents.   If the legislation could go further and provide a safe harbour for 
rightsholders who register their interfaces this could encourage registration and reduce action 
by patent trolls.  Software with interfaces available through the register can be specified in 
contracts which will help commercial enterprises follow the lead set by public authorities in 
stipulating open standards.  These initiatives combined with the ‘soft’ measures of model 
licenses and guidance on setting royalties recommended by the Commission Staff Working 
Document are a practical and measured step towards increased interoperability with 
minimum regulation and cost.   
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